'Almost-certain eventualities' are liveness properties that hold with probability 1. 'Abstract probabilities' in transition systems are those known only to be bounded away from zero and from one.
Introduction
Liveness properties of 'standard' non-probabilistic transition systems rely only on the connectivity of the system when considered as a graph. And the same is true in probabilistic systems, up to a point: 'almost-certain eventualities' depend only on 'abstract probabilities', not on precise probabilistic values.
For example, a typical eventuality is loop termination, expressed in temporal logic by the formula Q [¬G] where G is the loop guard; it is almost certain iff it occurs with probability 1. Over the state space {H, T } the 'coin-flipping' system s: = H p ⊕ s: = T , in which p ⊕ represents probabilistic choice, satisfies both Q[s=H] and Q[s=T ] almost certainly provided constant p lies strictly between zero and one.
More generally an abstract probabilistic choice, written just ⊕, is one in which the associated probability is not necessarily constant but still is bounded away from 0 and from 1. In this paper we investigate those issues within our quantitative extension qMµ [2, 3] of the modal µ-calculus [4] ; the extension in many cases acts as a probabilistic µ-calculus or even as a probabilistic temporal logic. (It can go beyond those, however, dealing directly with more general aspects like expected complexity [5] .)
Our principal contribution here is to show that the quantitative calculus can be specialised to a form of almost-certain eventualities and abstract probabilities, and that results are obtained that are similar to the 'traditional' probabilistic calculi: one does not need precise numeric values for the probabilistic transitions in the underlying system if one is interested only in almost-certain conclusions.
Our second contribution is to give a complexity bound for evaluation of almost certainties.
In the remainder of this section we describe the transition systems with which we will be concerned. Sections 2 and 3 review the existing calculi, in both their Boolean (traditional) and quantitative (our numeric extension) form; in Sections 4 and 5 we present our principal logical results. Section 6 presents a small example; and complexity is discussed in Section 7.
Our main results are Thm. 14 and the complexity bound of Sec. 7.
Standard transition systems and the µ-calculus
We say that a system is standard if it is not probabilistic or, if it is probabilistic, when its probabilities are all either 0 or 1. Standard transition systems over a state space S support a modal µ-calculus [4] for reasoning about their behaviour; expressions in the calculus denote Boolean-valued predicates (equivalently subsets of S), which are sets of states that can be shown with the calculus to lead to certain behaviours of the transition system.
The transition system can be given as elements of a state-to-state relation T : if (s, s ′ ) ∈ T then moving from state s to state s ′ is a possible transition; and if both (s, s ′ ) and (s, s ′′ ) are in T , for s ′ = s ′′ , then in a move from s the choice between s ′ and s ′′ can be resolved either 'demonically' or 'angelically' depending on one's application.
The µ-calculus can be specialised to a form of temporal logic by defining temporal operators within the calculus, like the eventually written Q above, and then using only those as a subset of the full language.
Probabilistic transition systems and qMµ
Probabilistic transition systems support a 'quantitative' modal µ-calculus qMµ, whose expressions are real-rather than Boolean-valued over S; the expressions denote 'expected values' of random variables over probabilistic distributions on the state space. The transitions exhibit probabilistic nondeterminism as well as potentially demonic and angelic.
As in the standard µ-calculus, temporal operators can be defined within qMµ: the result is a quantitative temporal logic which we have called qTL [2, 3] .
The standard µ-calculus embeds into qMµ by taking predicates, or their equivalent subsets, to the corresponding characteristic functions; and standard branching-time temporal logic embeds similarly into qTL.
For example, consider the probabilistic system of Fig. 1 . If b holds and n > 0, then b is eventually False only with probability 1/n -that is, the eventuality Q[¬b] depends on n's initial value -and in qTL (details below) we would simply say that Q[¬b] = 1/n in all states that satisfy b ∧ (n>0). Clearly the // State space is Bool × N.
var b: Bool; n: N; // Transition is 'enabled' only when b holds; otherwise it acts as skip.
b → b: = False 1/n 2 ⊕ n: = n + 1 Fig. 1 . A probabilistic transition system. 3 1/n result depends on the precise value 1/n 2 given in the transition: that is, the proof of Q[¬b] = 1/n in the calculus would involve quantitative reasoning based on that specific probability. (We give that proof in Sec. 3.2.) Fig. 1 is a special case however of the probabilistic system
one in which p is the function 1/n 2 of the state. A different specialisation would make p abstract, in which case ¬b is reached with probability 1 no matter what precise value(s) p may take. (Note that probability 1/n 2 is not abstract, as it is not bounded away from 0.)
We say in that case that eventually ¬b occurs almost certainly over the abstract probability p and, given that p's precise value is irrelevant for that conclusion, we could write the system (similarly to Rao's notation [7] )
with the additional implication however that the probability is abstract for both alternatives -that is, the implicit p indicated by ⊕ is bounded away from both 0 and 1.
In the sequel we show that in qTL, at least for finite state spaces, the truth of almost-certain eventualities depends only on abstract probabilities, never on their precise values; and we show how to specialise the calculus so that it can act directly over transition systems described as at (2) .
A standard µ-calculus expression E is of the form P predicate over S, typed S → Bool or equivalently PS
(µX.E(X)) least fixed-point of predicate transformer E(X) (νX.E(X)) greatest fixed-point of predicate transformer E(X)
Notes:
• For state s in S and predicate E we write E.s for the value of E at s, and we say that s satisfies E, or E holds at s, whenever that value is True. When E is given explicitly as a subset S ′ of S, we can write s ∈ S ′ for S ′ .s.
• In this paper we interpret the • operator demonically with respect to the underlying transition system T , so that s satisfies •E precisely when for all s ′ we have
• The next-time operator • satisfies the conjunctivity property
for all predicates P, Q. Note that (3) implies ⇒-monotonicity of •.
• Expressions E(X) are sometimes called predicate transformers (of X). We apply µ and ν only to transformers that are ⇒-monotonic. In this section we give a brief description of both the standard [4] and quantitative [2, 3] µ-calculi.
The standard calculus
Consider a transition system T : S ↔ S over a state space S. The standard modal µ-calculus comprises (expressions denoting) predicates of the form shown in Fig. 2 , allowing propositional operators, least-and greatest fixedpoints, and an implicit 'next-time' reference • to the effect of taking one step in T , with demonic resolution of any branching.
The transition system T is
The state space S is {a, b, c, d, e, f }, and P represents choice (interpreted demonically by •). For convenience we write the system using a programming-language like syntax, in which for example s = a denotes the predicate {a} and s: = c denotes the single transition S × {c}. The overall system is thus the relation T : = {a} × {c, d, e}.
Fig. 3. Example standard transition system
As an example, consider the transition system of Fig. 3 . We have a ∈ •{c, d, e} one step from a is guaranteed to reach {c, d, e}.
a ∈ •{c, d} one step from a might go to e instead.
a ∈ •{a} one step from a cannot reach a at all.
"no explicit step" is interpreted as skip.
As an illustration of conjunctivity (3, Fig. 3 ) we have for example
by inspection of T
The quantitative calculus qMµ
Consider a probabilistic transition system over a state space S, this time of the form S → PS in which initial states are taken to sets (P) of distributions (·) over S. 4 (Discrete) distributions S over S are maps from S into the unit interval [0, 1] of probabilities, and sum to 1 over the space.
The quantitative modal µ-calculus comprises R ≥ -valued functions of the form shown in Fig. 4 , called expectations, and by analogy with the standard case A quantitative µ-calculus expression E is of the form
(µX.E(X)) least fixed-point of expectation transformer E(X) (νX.E(X)) greatest fixed-point of expectation transformer E(X)
• For state s in S we write E.s for the value of E at s. For predicate P we write [P ] for its characteristic function, which embeds it into the quantitative model: thus [P ] .s = 1 iff s ∈ P .
• The • operator is interpreted over T , and we assume here that it is demonic and probabilistic so that expression •E is the least (over the demonic nondeterminism) expected value (over the probabilistic nondeterminism) of E after the computational step. That is •E.s is the minimum over all distributions D with (s, D) ∈ T of the expected value Exp D E of E over distribution D.
• Note that the special case •[P ].s gives the (demonically least) probability that one step from s will reach a state satisfying P , since the probability assigned an event P by a (state) distribution is equal to the expected value of its characteristic function [P ] over that same distribution: thus Exp
• We write ⇛ for "is everywhere no more than", and ⇚, ≡ similarly.
• Operator • is satisfies the new property of sublinearity [8] , that is
where a, b, c ≥ 0 are scalars, juxtaposition is multiplication and A, B are expectations; truncated subtraction ⊖ is defined
with lower syntactic precedence than +.
Note that (4) implies ⇛-monotonicity of •.
• We write c both for the scalar and for the constant 'everywhere-c' function. we allow arithmetic operators, least-and greatest fixed-points, and an implicit reference • to (the now demonic/probabilistic) T .
As an example, consider the transition system of Fig. 5 . We have
The state space S is again {a, b, c, d, e, f }, and p ⊕ represents probabilistic choice taking the left (resp. right) operand with probability p (resp. 1−p). The transition system here is { (a, 0, 0, 2/3, 1/3, 0, 0 ),
where · · · lists the component probabilities of a discrete distribution over the space a · · · f . •{c, d, e}.a = 1 one step from a is guaranteed to reach {c, d, e}.
•{c, d}.a = 2/3 when the probabilistic choice resolves to the right, the demonic choice will avoid d.
•{a}.a = 0 one step from a cannot reach a at all.
•{b}.b = 1 no explicit step is interpreted as skip. 
Operator & is useful because it both generalises Boolean conjunction 5 and, specialising sublinearity, satisfies a (sub-) distribution law (5) . It is our 'best quantitative approximation' to conjunctivity (3), in the sense of being the only operator of which we are aware with both those properties.
In the system of Fig. 4 , because we have for example that {c} ≡ {c, d}&{c, e}, we can illustrate (5) by verifying that
inspection of T Note that we have only an inequality, 6 whereas in the standard case (conjunctivity) we have equality.
Consequences of sublinearity include (by simple arithmetic [8, Sec. 7 pp. 340ff]) the following properties for all expectations A, B, where we write ⊓ for infimum and ⊔ for supremum: bounded up-continuity -Provided S is finite, the set of expectations A is up-directed and ⊔A is bounded above, we have
down-continuity -Provided S is finite and the set of expectations A is down-directed, we have
Specialisations to the temporal calculi
The modal calculi act as temporal calculi if one identifies specific types of expression for concepts like (among others) 'eventually', 'always' and 'unless' [9] . When based on the standard calculus, they give absolute (i.e., true or false) judgements; in the quantitative case, the judgements are probabilistic.
If sufficiently many steps are taken, then P will hold.
"always P "
No matter how many steps are taken P will continue to hold.
"P unless Q"
No matter how many steps are taken P will continue to hold, unless a state is reached in which Q holds. We write ": =" for "is defined to be". 
Standard temporal logic
We define some typical temporal operators in Fig. 6 . The role of conjunctivity (3) here is that it allows high-level proofs of temporal properties without referring directly to the underlying transition system. For example, one such property is the eventually-until lemma
which states that if P holds up to and including a possible step at which Q holds, and Q eventually does hold, then in fact P ∧ Q eventually holds. 8 In the appendix we give the straightforward proof of that as an example of the use of conjunctivity (Lem. 16).
"eventually A"
In qTL we restrict expectations to the range [0, 1] instead of R ≥ . The operational interpretation of the quantitative operators can require some ingenuity. Consider "QA": clearly it generalises the standard Q[P ], but for general expectation A it is not helpful to interpret it as "the probability that eventually A is established", because "establish A" conveys little if A is not a characteristic function. So what does QA mean? (Similar remarks apply to the other temporal operators.) Fortunately, it is true that in the special case Q[P ], the expression is indeed the probability of eventually establishing P . 9 More generally [2] the interpretation of QA relies on a game-like analogy: it is the supremum, over all strategies that determine in each state whether to make another transition or to stop, of the expected value of A when the strategy says "stop"; the strategy "never stop" gives 0 by definition.
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The situation with the other operators is similar.
Again (the generalisation of) conjunctivity plays an important role in highlevel reasoning. Using &-subdistribution, for example, we can prove a gener-alisation of (6); it is the quantitative eventually-until lemma
which we prove (Appendix) as Lem. 17.
As an example of probabilistic eventualities, we return to the system of Fig. 1 . We write out expectations as expressions over the program variables b, n, and calculate Q[¬b] directly (and unimaginatively) from the least-fixed-point limit implied by its definition (Fig. 7 ).
term 0: 0
•0 ≡ 0 by feasibility
. . .
so that we have
That is, termination is certain if ¬b holds (at the start), and occurs with probability 1/n if it does not.
Abstract reasoning in qTL
We have now completed our review of the existing calculi, and turn to our present contribution.
At the end of Sec. 3, we gave a calculation of •[¬b] for the system of Fig. 1 .
Consider the more general System (1) following it, but restrict p > 0 to be a constant. Then we have 11 term 0: 0
11 This heavy-handed 'limit' approach is not the only way to calculate Q[¬b] here: an alternative is to show from the definitions that
holds for this system, whence rearrangement and dividing by p gives us Q[¬b] ≡ 1.
But the point about explicit treatment of p remains.
We aim to show that in abstract systems like (1) it is possible to avoid explicit numeric calculations like the above.
The main technical result will be that the floor ⌊·⌋ and ceiling ⌈·⌉ operators can abstract from the 'intermediate' values lying strictly between 0 and 1: in finite state spaces we prove
whose left-hand side is 1 if Q[P ] is almost certain, and 0 otherwise; and the constructions ⌊· £ ·⌋ and ⌈Q·⌉ used in the right-hand side will be shown to depend only on abstract probabilities.
We begin with a general discussion.
'Almost-certain' is special for probabilistic systems
We place our work in context by recalling the following facts from finite-state Markov process theory, but in our notation. Let S be the finite state space.
• Operator • is a transition function over S. gives the probability of reaching P from s. More generally, for expectation A as a column vector we have •A as postmultiplication, and each element •A.s of the product gives the expected final value of A when taking a transition from s.
• State s ′ is reachable from state s iff • n {s ′ }.s > 0 for some finite n (the number of transitions taken).
• A subset P of S is closed (with respect to
• The probability of reaching P in one step from s -call it • 1 .P.s -is
•[P ].s.
• The probability of reaching P for the first time at the n th step, for n > 1,
• The probability of eventually reaching a subset P from state s, say • ∞ .P.s, is n>0
• n .P.s , which is also known as the first-passage probability from s to P .
• • ∞ .{s}.s is the probability of eventual return to s.
In that notation we can state the following theorem for Markov processes: Let • represent a Markov matrix, let S be a finite state space and s a state; and let C be the set of reachable states from s. Then
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That is, eventual return to s is almost certain if it is non-zero at every state reachable from s.
The important thing to note about the result is that p is specified only to be greater than 0. Equivalently, only the connectivity of the Markov process is important, rather than the actual values of the probabilities -which is why that proof rule for • ∞ .{s}.s is so simple.
We regard the result as a form of completeness, because it states that the connectivity information is always sufficient to establish the eventuality.
Our aim is to demonstrate that for probabilistic and demonic programs, a simpler calculus is all that is needed to prove (eventuality) properties with probability 1: as for standard programs only the "connectivity" of the program is important and not the actual probabilistic values. For many probabilistic programs, that will provide a sufficient proof rule, since probability 1 (or not) is all that is of interest.
Other recent work on the special properties of "probability 1" events in programs includes results of Rao [7] , Pnueli/Zuck [10] and Hart/Sharir/Pnueli [11] . Their completeness results in some cases assume various kinds of fairness.
Relevant properties of our temporal operators
We concentrate on next-time •, eventually Q and unless £. The following properties can be proved directly from the operators' definitions [3] or -in some cases -have been given above.
Lemma 1 Properties of next-time -For all expectations A, B,
12 Note that p[C].s ′ is just (p if s ′ ∈ C else 0), so that -after applying both sides to s ′ -the inequality p[C] ⇛ • ∞ .{s} says that for all s ′ ∈ C the first-passage probability • ∞ .{s}.s ′ from s ′ to s is at least p.
Lemma 2 Properties of eventually -For all expectations A, B,
(1) A ⇛ QA.
Lemma 3 Properties of unless -For all expectations A, B,
From these we have a form of completeness, based on the fact that the above properties determine the action of their respective operators. Although for probabilistic programs the same idea of finding the least solution to an equation remains valid (and is in that sense complete 14 ), even for finitestate programs discovering the actual real number values can still be rather tortuous, as we saw above. Indeed that is always going to be the case for non-(0-1) properties.
We seek a completeness property like Thm. 4 for abstract probabilistic programs -the idea is that if we only specify the transitions, merely indicating when they are probabilistic, then we only need use standard techniques, without having to introduce all the complications of the full quantitative calculus. It will turn out that merely replacing all probabilistic transitions by angelic, or by demonic choice will not do (see example in Sec. 8); rather, they must act angelically at some times, and demonically at others (see example at (16)).
Our first task is to show how to extract information "with probability 1".
From this point we assume that the transition system is probabilistic, and that the state space is finite. Recall our restriction in qTL to expectations that take values only in the unit interval [0, 1] rather than in the more general range R ≥ .
Floor and ceiling for 'almost certain'
Our principal tool will be the ceiling ⌈·⌉ and floor ⌊·⌋ operators (both taking expectations to expectations), defined With them we can write "almost certainly Q[P ]" as ⌊Q[P ]⌋, and our aim is to calculate that from the 'connectivity' alone -only the abstract probabilistic properties -of •.
Floor and ceiling for the 'connectivity' of •
We also use ceiling and floor to extract the connectivity (rather than the particular values of) the probabilistic transitions . With them we define two 'derived' transition operators, one converting probabilities to angelic choice, and the other converting them to demonic. Clearly • a and • d depend only on the connectivity, since they discard all numeric information; but it is not difficult to show that in fact they determine the connectivity.
Properties of • a and • d
Before proceeding to almost-eventually properties, we need the following technical results for our connectivity operators.
Lemma 6 Some properties of • d -Projection • d in effect replaces probabilistic by demonic choice: it is conjunctive over predicates and monotonic in general:
Lemma 7 Some properties of • a -Projection • a in effect replaces probabilistic by angelic choice, which is monotonic:
Almost-certainly is related to connectivity
We can now show that some almost-certainly properties -though not yet the one we want -depend only on the connectivity of •, as captured by • a and • d . Proof A£B is a greatest fixed-point, and so the result follows from Lem. 20 (Appendix) once we notice from Lem. 18 that
We treat QA similarly (Lem. 19 and Lem. 21). It will turn out that we can reach ⌊QA⌋ indirectly, via ⌊Q·⌋ of a more involved expression, at least when A is standard (see (10) in Thm. 14); for that we begin with the following lemma: Lemma 9 For all expectations A and transition systems • we have
Proof We show that A ⊔ •(⌈QA⌉ £ A) ⇛ ⌈QA⌉ £ A, which allows us to apply Property (3) of Lem. 2:
which is a consequence of Lem. 19.
P

Lem. 9 gives us trivially a connectivity-calculable upper bound on ⌊QA⌋: it is
Lemma 10 Upper bound for almost-certain eventuality
Proof Lem. 9 and the monotonicity of ⌊·⌋. P
The right hand side is calculable from the connectivity of •, because by Lem. 8
we know that ⌈QA⌉ is so calculable, and by Lem. 8 (again) so is ⌊⌈QA⌉ £ A⌋.
In the next section we show that we achieve equality when A is standard.
0-1 laws and temporal logic
In this section we show how the introduction of a 0-1 law (or axiom) is all that is needed to show that ⌊Q[P ]⌋ does indeed rely only on connectivity. 17 We gave an example of the 0-1 law for purely probabilistic programs; the idea has been extended to probabilistic/demonic programs [12, 13] using the notation and ideas of temporal logic.
Lemma 11 0-1 Law -For any expectation A, predicate P and probability
Proof The full proof -allowing demonic nondeterminism and possiblyaborting transitions -is beyond the scope of this paper; but it is a simple consequence of 0-1 results on the probabilistic treatment of loops [13, Lem. 6.1 p10], obtained (partly) by reasoning over the model.
As an illustration, however, we give a proof entirely in qTL (Thm. 22 in the appendix) for the restricted case of non-demonic and terminating transitions. P The above law is valid for all state spaces: but for finite state spaces it has a much more compact formulation.
Lemma 12 0-1 Law (finite state spaces) -In finite state models, Lem. 11 is equivalent to
Proof Suppose the interpretation of • is over a finite state space.
18 That means that Lem. 11 is equivalent to the following, in which we have eliminated the abstract p by introducing ⌈·⌉:
17 It is only now that we must make some restrictions to predicates, rather than general expectations, which is why we write [P ] rather than A. 18 To see that (9) does not hold for infinite state spaces, consider this system over S : = Z that defines a random walker on the integers:
is not equal to 1. 19 We are relying on the fact that, for finite state spaces, "pX ⇛ Y for some 0 < p" and "X ⇛ ⌈Y ⌉" are equivalent: take p to be (⊓s: S | X.s = 0 · Y.s/X.s), which infimum cannot be 0 because S is finite.
We now show that (8) holds iff (9) holds.
by cases on P.s whence our assumption (8) gives us A £ [P ] ⇛ Q[P ], as desired overall.
(9) implies (8) From Lems. 3(1) and 2(1) we have
hence we have immediately from (9) that
P
Corollary 13
For finite models,
Proof In finite models we may use the second form Lem. 12 of the 0-1 law; the result then follows from Lemma 9. P Cor. 13 is the key to showing that for probability-1 properties, connectivity is sufficient.
Theorem 14
Completeness for probability-1 eventualities -If • is interpreted over a finite-state probabilistic system, and P is a state predicate, then
Proof Cor. 13 gives us that
, from which we have
Since ⌊· £ ·⌋ and ⌈Q·⌉ depend only on the connectivity, the result follows. P
Example
Consider again the abstract system
The probabilistic connectivity is given by
, because there is a non-zero probability of establishing any non-empty predicate over {H, T }.
because there is a non-zero probability of avoiding any non-total predicate over {H, T }.
Now we look at the almost-certain eventuality ⌊Q{H}⌋; we have
Lems. 3(2), 1(3)
Complexity analysis
We now look at the time-complexity of evaluating almost-certainties in qTL: the precise language and its interpretation is set out in Fig. 8 ; and our result is that the complexity of evaluating ⌊Φ⌋ over transition system T is linear in the number of temporal operators in Φ and in the number of transitions in T .
We outline a proof of that in this section.
Throughout the following we will use the specific formula Φ 0 , defined
as a running example: we want to evaluate ⌊Φ 0 ⌋. and the interpretation of the formula is via the quantitative µ-calculus, as given earlier in Fig. 7 . The formula is said to be almost certain at a state s of a given transition system if it evaluates to 1 at s. 
"demonic-always A"
These operators are analogues of the ∃Q, ∀P etc. of conventional (probabilistic) temporal logic. To distribute ⌊·⌋ inwards we use the equalities set out in this lemma:
Proof Only (12) needs comment. Its proof relies on the fact that Q, like •, is semi-sublinear [14] ; given that, its proof mimics that of Lem. 18.
Note that we do not use Q d (with the obvious definition) in this case, because we cannot: recall the remarks following Lem. 8. P
Using our lemma with Φ 0 , we have
in which all explicit expectations (A, B, C) have been made standard (⌊A⌋, ⌊B⌋, ⌊C⌋).
Convert Q's to standard operators
The procedure of the previous section eliminated all properly probabilistic modal operators, replacing them with demonic versions, except for Q. To deal with Q we use our main result Cor. 13 which, combined with the above and Lem. 8, allows us to state that
provided A is standard. Since the inward propagation of the previous section has made all sub-formulae standard, indeed (15) applies: in the case of Φ 0 we can continue
We use the 'where'-clause to remember that X has been duplicated, so that we need calculate it only once.
Evaluate ⌊Φ⌋
The two translations of the previous sections transform Φ into an expression
The number of those operators is no more than twice the number of operators in the original formula, provided the duplication inherent in (15) is properly noted. Thus our result will follow if we can establish that evaluation of each of those operators is linear in the size of the transition system. We discuss that briefly for each operator in turn; in each case P, Q are standard.
• d P -• d treats the system as entirely demonic. Examine all states, and select only those all of whose outgoing transitions lead into P .
Q a P -If the original system contains demonic (as well as probabilistic) choice, then the system will be treated as demonic/angelic by Q a -that is, although the probabilistic choice is made angelic, the pure demonic choice is retained. The operational behaviour for each complete transition is a 'first-stage' demonic choice of 'half-transition' followed by a 'secondstage' angelic choice of half-transition. Start with the set of states P , and for each of its states follow all second-stage angelic half-transitions back, colouring their sources; if the source was uncoloured, continue on to follow back the first-stage halftransition, decrementing the 'first-stage transition count' of its originating state (prepared beforehand).
Having done that for all of P , go over the transitions again this time deleting all second-stage transitions followed, and adding all states whose first-stage count has become zero, in that case deleting the first-stage transitions as well.
Continue the process until no states are added; each transition will have been followed at most a constant number of times (amortised).
treats the system as entirely demonic; we work with the complement. Start with the set of states ¬P ∧¬Q, and for each transition leading backwards from there:
• if it leads into Q, ignore it; and • if it leads into P ∧ ¬Q, add that state to the set. In either case, delete the transition; and repeat the process with the added states, stopping the whole procedure when no new states are added. The result is the complement of the accumulated states; and in the process, each transition is considered at most once.
In the case of Φ 0 we carry out four calculations from the above, two within X and two outside it.
Conclusion
Abstract probabilities and 0-1 laws have long been recognised as important techniques for simplifying analysis in probabilistic systems. However the tendency has been to use formulations of those laws at the level of models [15, 7, 1] and not to integrate them formally as axioms of program logic, as is customary for other operational phenomena.
There are certainly difficulties in importing well-understood concepts directly from probability theory to a computational context, due to the complicating factor of nondeterminism: it is not present in classical probability theory. Many of those difficulties can be resolved using the probabilistic version of Dijkstra/Hoare-style program logic [8] which is intended to deal naturally with nondeterminism, probability and their interaction. In addition temporal logic provides a framework for handling properties of infinite (repeated) executions of programs -precisely the situation where 0-1 laws begin to bite. The resulting fragment of qMµ described in this paper, and used to define the temporal operators of qTL, is thus ideal for studying probability, nondeterminism and 0-1 laws all together.
In qTL we find, as in other works, that probabilistic choice when used specifically for "probability-1" properties can (to an extent) be interpreted angelically. But this is definitely not sound in all situations, and sometimes a demonic interpretation is necessary. A direct calculation shows that the probability of eventually reaching s=2 is strictly less than 1 (unless the system is initially in that state). But an angelic interpretation for ⊕ in ⌊Q[s=2]⌋ would give 1, and therefore must be unsound. To see that a demonic interpretation is also unsound consider the probability of eventually reaching s=0. Again a direct calculation shows that it is 1 irrespective of the initial state, whereas a demonic interpretation of ⊕ in the formula ⌊Q[s=0]⌋ gives 0 (except from s=0 initially).
Indeed finding an optimal balance between the two interpretations -in order to maintain soundness in all situations -is a major challenge. Using Lems. 8, 15 and the notations of Fig. 9 , we can rewrite the conclusion of Thm. 14 as where, on the right, we omit the [·] brackets to bring out its resemblance to standard branching-time temporal logic, and to highlight its use of both angelic-and demonic abstractions of probabilistic choice. Rao [7] also uses two abstractions of probabilistic choice, though he imposes fairness on the execution sequences, which we do not. Others (Hart et al. [12] , Vardi [1] use similar ideas, but their work is model-rather than logic-based.
A more general comparison with the standard logics is given in the laws [3, Fig. 7 ], which we reproduce (partially) as Fig. 10 . They are valid in qTL generally (though not claimed to be complete), but can be specialised to "with probability 1" by applying ⌊·⌋ and using only standard expectations: thus ( * ) becomes the well-known
In case ( * * ) however, cannot eliminate the ⌊·⌋ so easily: we are left with the less attractive-looking but still reasonable
which means "if all reachable states satisfying P satisfy Q also, and P is reached with probability 1, then so is Q." It is worth investigating whether there is a complete collection in this style of laws for with-probability-1 properties.
The emphasis of our work has been to clarify exactly when each of the two 21 Since the lhs is standard, there is no need for ⌊·⌋ on the right. interpretations of ⊕ is appropriate for the interpretation of temporal formulae in probabilistic systems. Granting the 0-1 law the status of a logical axiom proved to be critical in doing so.
To summarise, we have shown that the demonic interpretation goes with greatest fixed-points ("always" and "unless") and "=1" probabilities , and that the angelic goes with least fixed points ("eventually") and ">0" probabilities, finally leaving the 0-1 law standing out as the key idea underlying their combination in "=1" eventually properties.
A secondary contribution of this work is the complexity of the model checking problem. The result sketched in Sec. 7 shows that for the logic corresponding to "worst case" probabilistic CTL the complexity is linear in the size of the formula and the size of the underlying transition system. That matches the best known complexity for nonprobabilistic CTL interpreted over nonprobabilistic transition systems [17] . We note however that this work presents a very specialised case of the more general model-checking problem, which allows for the possibility of angelic as well as demonic nondeterminism [1] . Indeed it still appears that the luxury of enhancing the logic's expressivity in this way is paid by the complexity in the model checking, for the best known algorithms imply that (in this case) it is quadratic (e.g. de Alfaro and Henzinger [18] , Courcoubetis and Yannakakis [19] and Vardi [1] ).
Proof Let L n and R n be the n th terms respectively in the ⊔-limits for the least fixed-points QQ and Q(P ∧ Q). We show by induction that
Base case: L 0 ≡ R 0 ≡ False.
Inductive case:
propositional reasoning; conjunctivity (3)
propositional reasoning; inductive hypothesis; monotonicity
We complete the proof by observing that "(P £ (P ∧ Q)) ∧" distributes through ⊔-limits. P Lemma 17 probabilistic eventually-until -For all expectations A, B we have
Proof We follow the proof of Lem. 16, but must be careful in two respects: first, that we generalise ∧ sometimes to ⊓ and sometimes to &; and second that -unlike ∧ -the operator & is not idempotent. It is associative, however.
Let L n and R n be the n th terms respectively in the ⊔-limits for the least fixedpoints QB and Q (A & B) . We show by induction that
Base case: L 0 ≡ R 0 ≡ 0.
We complete the proof by observing that "(A£(A& B)) &" distributes through ⊔-limits. P
Lemma 18
For all expectations A we have
Proof We use sublinearity (Property 4 Fig. 4 ). For any n ≥ 0 we have by arithmetic that
and, because the state space S is finite, there is some (large enough) n A for which (A.1) is actually an equality. Now
The reverse inequality is immediate from monotonicity. P
Lemma 19
For all expectations A we have • a A ≡ • a ⌈A⌉.
Proof Again we use sublinearity (as scaling and feasibility; see end Sec. 2.2). For any n ≥ 0 we have that
and, because the state space S is finite, there is some (large enough) n A for which (A.2) is actually an equality. Now Proof Because ⌊·⌋ distributes through infimum ⊓, we prove by induction that ⌊F n .1⌋ ≡ G n .1 . Proof Because ⌈·⌉ distributes through supremum ⊔, we prove by induction that
For that the proof is analogous to Lem. 20. provided • is deterministic and terminating.
Proof We rely on four main ideas, based on thinking of I as a loop invariant and G as the loop guard. The first idea is that I £ [¬G] is an invariant of any loop with guard G: if I £ [¬G] holds 22 initially, then it continues to hold up to and including loop termination, the point at which ¬G is established.
The second idea is that invariance is preserved by scaling: if J is any invariant, then so is pJ for any scalar 0 ≤ p. That will tell us, from above, that p(I£ [¬G] ) is invariant too.
The third idea is that 1−Q[¬G] is invariant also, provided the system is deterministic and terminating. Its being invariant says "if ¬G is not a guaranteed eventuality here, then taking a computational step won't make it so". The fourth idea is that the sum of two invariants, provided that sum is well defined in the sense of lying between 0 and 1, is also an invariant.
Combining all those, we will be able to show that the complicated expression is an invariant; but from it we'll conclude that
whence division by p will give us our desired conclusion (A.4). The only place we use our assumption (A.3) is to to note that it ensures (trivially) that J is well defined (lies in [0, 1]); the only place we use p > 0 is in the division that takes us from (A.6) to (A.4).
We begin by noting that invariance of J conventionally means "if it holds now, then it continues to hold up until and including the step in which ¬G becomes true, if ¬G ever does become true". That is, to say that J is invariant we require
where the extra J& ensures it remains true for the final step ('as the loop exits'). But (A.7) follows from the simpler 8) which is just the way one reasons about loop invariants: 23 to show that we calculate We have now shown that J satisfies (A.7).
To finish off, we put "&Q[¬G]" on both sides of (A.7), and use Lem. whence -using scaling of Q -we end up with (A.6), as required. P
